Introduction
While the global standards framework for EV charging infrastructure establishes comprehensive technical requirements addressing security, privacy, and operational concerns, real-world implementations frequently diverge significantly from specified standards. Security researchers have documented substantial vulnerabilities in production charging equipment, protocol implementations, and network architectures that contradict the security assumptions embedded in regulatory frameworks. These vulnerabilities have enabled multiple security incidents affecting millions of users globally, exposing sensitive personal data, payment information, and vehicle identification data to compromise.
This analysis examines documented security incidents affecting EV charging infrastructure, identifies common vulnerability patterns, and discusses the implications of these incidents for the broader charging ecosystem. Understanding these real-world security challenges is essential for CPOs seeking to deploy resilient charging networks that function securely despite the persistent gap between standards specifications and practical implementations.
Part 1: Major Incidents and Threat Landscape
The November 2024 Global CPO Data Breach: A Multi-Network Compromise
In mid-November 2024, threat researchers documented a significant data breach affecting EV charging infrastructure globally, exposing approximately 116,000 records of sensitive personal, vehicle, and infrastructure data[1]. The breach was initially attributed to a single American EV manufacturer's charging network but subsequently revealed implications across diverse charging stations in multiple countries, with affected users distributed across the United Arab Emirates, Australia, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Guyana, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and India[1].
The compromised dataset included personally identifiable information comprising names, contact details, and home addresses of EV owners; detailed vehicle information including makes, models, vehicle identification numbers (VINs), raw authentication keys, and security tokens enabling vehicle impersonation; precise geolocation data for charging station locations creating physical security risks; and OCPP logs documenting raw communications between CPOs and charging station equipment[1].
Analysis of the breach revealed that multiple independent CPOs were utilizing a common EV charging management application developed by an Indian energy management provider[1]. Investigation traced the compromises to vulnerabilities in OCPP protocol implementations and weak authentication mechanisms in the shared application platform. This incident revealed that shared software stacks across multiple independent CPOs created cascading compromise risks, where vulnerabilities in single-sourced applications could compromise numerous operators simultaneously[1].
The breach's implications extended substantially beyond simple data exposure. Stolen authentication keys and tokens provided attackers with mechanisms to impersonate legitimate vehicles in future charging sessions, creating fraud and identity theft risks. Exposed OCPP logs documented protocol implementation details, enabling reverse engineering of management system implementations and identification of additional vulnerability patterns applicable across multiple networks[1]. The geographic distribution of affected infrastructure demonstrated systemic vulnerabilities extending across multiple independent operators, suggesting that architectural similarities and code sharing patterns propagated vulnerabilities across the ecosystem[1].
Incident Trend Analysis: Growing Attack Volume
Industry analysis estimated that approximately 6% of all automotive and smart mobility cybersecurity incidents in 2024 involved EV chargers, representing an increase from approximately 4% in 2023[2]. This acceleration in incident frequency reflects both the growing operational importance of charging infrastructure and the maturation of attack techniques specifically targeting this domain[2]. Ransomware attacks represent the most prevalent attack category targeting automotive and smart mobility infrastructure, with security researchers identifying more than 100 ransomware incidents in 2024 accounting for nearly 25% of all security incidents affecting the EV ecosystem[2].
The growing threat landscape reflects multiple contributing factors. First, the expanding installed base of charging equipment creates expanding attack surfaces as the number of potential targets increases globally. Second, the relative immaturity of security practices in the charging sector compared to traditional automotive or energy industries creates exploitation opportunities. Third, the distributed nature of charging infrastructure across public locations makes targeting and reconnaissance easier for attackers compared to protected enterprise systems[2].
Ransomware attacks targeting charging infrastructure differ substantially from traditional ransomware campaigns due to the critical nature of energy infrastructure and public accessibility of attack targets. CPOs cannot rely on air-gapped backups or offline recovery procedures applicable to traditional enterprise systems; charging stations must remain accessible to public users throughout recovery operations, limiting defensive options available during active incidents[2].
Part 2: Technical Vulnerabilities and Attack Vectors
Hardware-Level Authentication Bypass Vulnerabilities
Academic security researchers identified comprehensive authentication bypass vulnerabilities in production charging equipment that fundamentally contradicted security standards specifications. These vulnerabilities included complete absence of authentication mechanisms for web interfaces and MQTT communication servers on specific equipment model variants[3]. These devices exposed administrative configuration capabilities without requiring any authentication credentials, enabling network-based attackers to access administrative functions through simple HTTP requests without password or certificate validation[3].
Additional hardware vulnerabilities included hard-coded root credentials stored in persistent device configuration, undocumented web scripts executing with administrative privileges, and USB-accessible configuration mechanisms that permitted direct modification of device settings through physical access to equipment[3]. These vulnerabilities demonstrated that even contemporary production charging equipment frequently lacked fundamental security controls specified in governing standards[3].
The implications of hardware-level vulnerabilities extend throughout deployed charging networks. Compromised devices could modify their charging behavior to execute billing fraud by misreporting energy delivery, deliver damaging voltage or current conditions to connected vehicles causing battery damage, participate in coordinated denial-of-service attacks against grid infrastructure through synchronized load manipulation, or inject malicious firmware updates propagating to other network equipment through management system communications[3].
OCPP Protocol Implementation Flaws
Academic analysis of OCPP protocol implementations identified persistent vulnerabilities that contradicted the protocol's stated security specifications. OCPP implementations remained susceptible to multiple attack vectors including boot notification eavesdropping enabling serial number and vendor information extraction, session key compromise through man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks enabling attackers to masquerade as legitimate charging stations, and manipulation of transaction authorization enabling fraudulent charging or energy theft[4][5].
Particularly concerning, analysis of OCPP boot notification processes—where charging points establish initial synchronization with management systems—revealed fundamental vulnerabilities where attackers eavesdropping on these communications could extract charging point model and vendor identifiers[4]. This information could subsequently be used to forge command messages or impersonate legitimate infrastructure. Researchers demonstrated that attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to completely regulate entire charging processes by impersonating legitimate nodes, effectively gaining control over power delivery and billing functions[4].
Additional vulnerabilities in OCPP implementations enabled attackers to forward transactions from one charging point to another malicious charging point, enabling fraudulent energy consumption billing to unaware users[4]. This attack vector required network-level access but once achieved enabled substantial revenue theft through transaction manipulation[4].
A particularly severe real-world vulnerability documented in Phoenix Contact CHARX SEC-3100 devices, designated CVE-2024-858 by the Zero Day Initiative, illustrated the practical consequences of OCPP implementation failures[6]. This vulnerability permitted network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected charging installations without requiring authentication, exploiting a lack of encryption in OCPP protocol implementations[6]. The vulnerability enabled compromise of affected devices with administrative (root) privileges, potentially enabling attackers to modify charging behavior, steal transaction data, or inject malicious firmware[6].
Remote Code Execution and Firmware Compromise
A critical integer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2024-37310) discovered in the EVerest framework's V2G Transport Protocol implementation permitted attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected charging stations following physical cable access to affected equipment[7]. The vulnerability exploited improper bounds checking in power consumption calculations, enabling attackers to bypass authentication protections and execute code with charging station privileges[7].
This vulnerability's implications were particularly severe because successful exploitation enabled attackers to compromise private cryptographic keys stored in charging equipment[7]. Attackers could extract these keys and subsequently use them to authorize fraudulent transactions, impersonate legitimate chargers to communicate with vendor backend systems using OCPP, or modify charging behavior in subtle ways that might evade detection[7].
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Vendor Backdoors
Research documented sophisticated supply chain vulnerabilities where charging station vendors maintained independent OCPP management channels parallel to third-party charging management systems (CSMS) deployed by CPOs[8]. These vendor-controlled shadow channels enabled vendors to send commands directly to charging stations, completely bypassing CPO-deployed management systems and security controls[8]. Attackers exploiting access control weaknesses in vendor web services could send control messages to any charging station by specifying the equipment's serial number, with no authorization validation preventing unauthorized station manipulation[8].
The architectural implications of this vulnerability pattern revealed fundamental trust boundary issues in contemporary charging infrastructure. CPOs believed they maintained operational control over deployed equipment through their management systems, yet vendors retained independent command channels enabling unilateral modification of charging behavior[8]. This created security blind spots where CPOs had visibility into their own management systems but not into independent vendor-controlled channels communicating with the same equipment[8].
Charging stations continuously transmitted device logs through unsecured HTTP channels to vendor backends, with logs containing actual OCPP messages, WiFi credentials, and configuration data[8]. This created direct pathways for attackers to infiltrate from compromised charging equipment into organizational IT infrastructure, potentially enabling lateral movement to systems controlling billing, payment processing, or user account management[8].
RFID Authentication Vulnerabilities
Legacy RFID card authentication systems continue widespread deployment despite well-documented vulnerabilities in underlying cryptographic implementations[9]. MIFARE Classic RFID cards, subject to well-known cryptographic attacks since 2007, remain in common use for EV charging authentication despite superior alternatives[9]. Many CPOs store publicly readable, unencrypted UUIDs directly on card surfaces, creating authentication vulnerabilities that enable straightforward compromise[9].
Attackers can physically approach charging stations, extract credential data from RFID cards in proximity using inexpensive readers, create counterfeit RFID cards replicating legitimate credentials, and fraudulently initiate charging sessions that bill transactions to unaware user accounts[9]. The victim account holder may not discover fraudulent charges for extended periods, depending on billing and notification procedures[9].
The prevalence of RFID vulnerabilities reflects the substantial installed base of legacy charging equipment lacking modern security implementations. Many charging networks deployed RFID authentication systems years ago when the technology was considered state-of-the-art. Upgrading charging networks to eliminate RFID vulnerabilities requires wholesale equipment replacement, creating substantial capital expenditure barriers for CPOs with geographically distributed infrastructure. This economic reality has enabled persistent vulnerability patterns to remain exploitable for extended periods despite well-understood technical risks[9].
Operational Data Exposure and Information Leakage
Charging infrastructure generates substantial quantities of operational data reflecting charging patterns, user behavior, facility operations, and system configurations. This operational data frequently leaks through insecure channels or storage mechanisms, creating information security risks[2].
A 2024 incident involving an EV charging provider revealed that unauthorized access occurred to customer data through a third-party service provider that exceeded its authorized access scope[10]. Investigation revealed unusual SSH sessions and API calls outside normal workflows, with forensic analysis indicating potential insider misuse rather than external breach[10]. The incident exposed customer names, email addresses, and account information, though payment data was protected through tokenization and point-to-point encryption, and vehicle identification numbers and home addresses were not compromised[10].
Part 3: Grid-Level Threats and Systemic Risk
Coordinated Attack Scenarios
CPOs face emerging threats from coordinated attacks targeting multiple charging stations simultaneously, creating systemic grid stability risks beyond individual network compromise[11]. Attackers controlling large numbers of compromised chargers could execute demand-side power grid attacks by manipulating charging speeds in coordinated patterns, creating artificial demand spikes or drops that destabilize grid frequency[11].
Theoretical analysis demonstrates that coordinated manipulation of charging speeds at even modest percentages of the installed charger base (5-10% of total capacity) could shift grid frequency beyond safe limits, potentially triggering cascading failures and widespread blackouts[11]. This creates national-level infrastructure risk as EV charging capacity approaches significant percentages of grid demand in developed nations[11].
Nation-State and Critical Infrastructure Targeting
Nation-state actors and terrorist organizations have demonstrated explicit interest in attacking critical energy infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure represents an expanding attack surface as deployment scales globally, offering distributed targets that are harder to defend than centralized power plants or transmission facilities[11].
The distributed nature of charging infrastructure, with thousands of individual nodes spread across geographic areas, creates targeting challenges for defenders while providing multiple exploitation opportunities for attackers. The public accessibility of most charging infrastructure also enables physical reconnaissance and attack preparation without specialized access[11].
Part 4: Risk Mitigation and Defense Implementation
Foundational Security Controls
CPOs must implement fundamental security controls preventing the most common and easily exploitable vulnerabilities. These controls represent essential baseline protections regardless of organizational size or deployment scope[12].
Network Segregation: Charging infrastructure should be segregated from other organizational IT systems through network isolation, preventing attackers who compromise charging equipment from easily accessing billing systems, customer databases, or payment processing infrastructure[12]. Virtual network segregation through VLANs requires careful design to ensure proper isolation.
Encryption Implementation: All network communications between charging stations, management systems, and backend services must employ TLS 1.2 or higher with strong cipher suites[12]. Customer data stored in backend databases must be encrypted using AES-256 or equivalent algorithms. Application-level encryption should be distinguished from file-system level encryption; application encryption provides protection against database access through alternative paths[12].
Multi-Factor Authentication: Administrative access to charging network management systems must require multi-factor authentication combining password authentication with time-based one-time passwords or hardware security keys[12]. Administrative sessions should implement time-limited access tokens with automatic revocation after specified periods[12].
Vulnerability Scanning: All systems should be scanned regularly for known vulnerabilities using automated scanning tools, with results aggregated and prioritized by severity[12]. Scanning should increase as threat levels escalate or new vulnerability patterns emerge targeting charging infrastructure[12].
Advanced Monitoring and Detection
Beyond foundational controls, CPOs should implement continuous monitoring systems providing visibility into charging network operations and detection of suspicious activities indicating compromise[13].
Intrusion Detection Systems: Network-based intrusion detection systems should monitor charging network traffic for suspicious patterns including unusual connection sequences, authentication bypass attempts, or unexpected protocol sequences[13]. Host-based intrusion detection can identify unusual processes, file modifications, or resource consumption patterns on charging stations[13].
Anomaly Detection: Machine learning-based systems can identify unusual patterns in charging behavior, user authentication patterns, or network flows that deviate from established baselines[13]. Anomaly detection can identify compromised equipment operating normally from a functional perspective but exhibiting unusual operational characteristics[13].
Security Information and Event Management: Centralized SIEM systems should aggregate logs from charging equipment, management systems, payment systems, and network infrastructure[13]. SIEM systems should maintain immutable audit logs protected against modification or deletion[13].
Incident Response Readiness
CPOs must prepare for security incidents through systematic incident response planning and regular testing[14].
Incident Response Teams: Dedicated incident response teams should include security engineers, network administrators, legal counsel, and public relations professionals[14]. Clear roles and escalation procedures should define decision-making authority during incidents[14].
Investigation Procedures: Forensic procedures should preserve evidence while minimizing operational disruption. Log preservation, memory capture, and disk imaging should follow forensic hygiene best practices maintaining chain of custody[14].
Communication Protocols: Clear communication procedures should specify notification timelines to affected customers, regulatory authorities, and public media[14]. GDPR requires notification of affected data subjects within 72 hours if breach poses risk to individual rights[14].
Recovery Planning: Systematic recovery procedures should restore affected systems to known good states[14]. Compromised equipment should not be immediately re-deployed without thorough investigation and remediation[14].
Third-Party Risk Management
CPOs depend on numerous third parties including equipment manufacturers, software vendors, and maintenance contractors. Inadequate third-party management has been implicated in multiple charging network breaches[15].
Vendor Security Assessments: Before engaging third parties, CPOs should conduct comprehensive security assessments evaluating vendor security practices, certifications, incident response capabilities, and financial stability[15]. Assessments should include review of SOC 2 reports, penetration test results, and information security policies[15].
Contractual Requirements: Vendor contracts should explicitly require compliance with organizational security policies, regular security audits, incident notification procedures, and cyber liability insurance[15].
Credential Management: Third-party vendor credentials should be managed through centralized systems enabling rapid revocation if relationships terminate[15]. Vendor access should be segregated from production administrative credentials with specific scopes defined per vendor[15].
Regular Audits: CPOs should conduct regular audits of third-party access to critical systems, verifying that activities remain within authorized scope[15].
Part 5: GDPR Compliance and Data Protection
The 72-Hour Breach Notification Requirement
GDPR breach notification requirements create extremely tight timelines for CPOs to detect, investigate, and notify authorities of data breaches[16][17]. Organizations must notify supervisory authorities within 72 hours of becoming aware of any personal data breach[16]. This timeline presupposes rapid incident detection—organizations often lack immediate awareness that breaches have occurred, particularly in sophisticated attack scenarios where attackers operate quietly to avoid detection[16][17].
Failure to meet the 72-hour timeline without reasonable justification triggers substantial penalties, with fines potentially reaching €10 million or 2% of global annual revenue[17]. For large charging networks processing millions of customer records, this timeline creates significant operational pressure to maintain sophisticated incident detection capabilities and pre-established notification procedures[16][17].
Data Protection by Design
CPOs must implement data protection considerations throughout system design rather than adding privacy protections post-deployment[18]. This requires data minimization at system architecture stage, collecting only personal data strictly necessary for charging service provision[18]. CPOs should implement automated data deletion when retention periods expire, preventing indefinite accumulation of personal information[18].
Explicit consent must be obtained before processing personal data for any purpose beyond direct charging service provision[18]. Consent mechanisms should provide granular options enabling users to approve or reject specific processing activities[18].
Data Subject Rights Implementation
CPOs must implement procedures enabling users to exercise rights including access (receiving their personal data), portability (transferring data to other services), erasure (deletion of retained data), rectification (correcting inaccurate data), and objection (refusing future processing)[18]. These procedures must typically be implemented within 30 days of requests[18].
Part 6: Organizational Readiness and Long-Term Strategy
Security Culture Development
Systematic security improvement extends beyond technical controls to organizational culture emphasizing security awareness and accountability[19]. Employees should understand their security responsibilities, including incident reporting procedures, secure password practices, and social engineering awareness[19].
Management must demonstrate commitment to security through resource allocation, incident investigation, and continuous improvement initiatives[19]. Security practices should be integrated into regular operational procedures rather than treated as separate compliance activities[19].
Cybersecurity Insurance
Given potential financial impacts of security incidents including regulatory fines, customer litigation, and recovery costs, CPOs should evaluate cyber liability insurance[20]. Insurance policies should cover regulatory fines, notification costs, business interruption losses, and legal fees[20].
Insurers typically require implementation of baseline security controls as prerequisites for coverage[20]. CPOs should verify that implemented controls satisfy insurer requirements and maintain documentation proving compliance[20].
Information Sharing and Industry Collaboration
CPOs should participate in industry information sharing mechanisms enabling rapid dissemination of emerging threat intelligence[21]. Industry groups including CharIN (Charging Interface Initiative) maintain threat intelligence databases and incident repositories enabling CPOs to benefit from broader ecosystem visibility[21].
CPOs should contribute to incident databases and reporting mechanisms, enabling broader community awareness of incident patterns and emerging attack techniques[21].
Conclusion: Building Resilience Through Security Maturity
The gap between EV charging standards specifications and real-world implementations remains substantial, with security incidents repeatedly demonstrating that production infrastructure lacks security controls specified in governing standards. Recent breaches exposing millions of customer records, authentication mechanisms bypassed through straightforward attacks, and vendor-controlled shadow channels enabling unauthorized equipment modification reveal systemic security challenges extending across the charging ecosystem.
CPOs seeking to establish resilient charging infrastructure must adopt comprehensive risk-based approaches addressing security systematically across physical and digital domains. This requires immediate implementation of foundational security controls preventing the most prevalent attack categories, continuous monitoring systems enabling rapid incident detection, disciplined third-party management preventing vendor-introduced vulnerabilities, and organizational security cultures emphasizing systematic improvement.
The security challenges facing EV charging infrastructure are surmountable through committed implementation of known best practices, rigorous standard compliance, and proactive threat identification and response. The organizations that succeed in this transition will establish competitive differentiation through demonstrated security excellence, attracting enterprise customers and fleet operators requiring assured data protection and reliable charging operations.
The charging infrastructure ecosystem stands at a critical inflection point where the security decisions made over the next 12-24 months will substantially influence whether this vital energy infrastructure achieves adequate security maturity, or whether fundamental vulnerabilities embedded during early development persist for years. The evidence presented throughout this analysis suggests that while challenges are substantial, they are surmountable through sustained commitment to security excellence and continuous improvement.
References
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[2] Upstream Auto. (2024). "Automotive Cybersecurity Report 2024 - EV Charging Threats." https://upstream.auto/
[3] OneKey. (2025). "Critical Vulnerabilities in EV Charging Stations: Analysis of Hardy Barth Devices." https://www.onekey.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-ev-charging-stations/
[4] NICS-UMA. (2024). "OCPP Protocol: Security Threats and Challenges." https://nics.uma.es/pub/papers/OCPP_Security_Threats.pdf
[5] ENCS. (2024). "Security threat analysis for EV charging infrastructure." https://encs.eu/en/security-threat-analysis-for-ev-charging-infrastructure/
[6] Zero Day Initiative. (2024). "ZDI-24-858: Phoenix Contact CHARX SEC-3100 OCPP Authentication Bypass." https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-858/
[7] INL Digital Library. (2024). "Disrupting EV Charging Sessions and Gaining Remote Code Execution - CVE-2024-37310." https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/
[8] SaiFlow. (2024). "Exploiting Hidden Supply-Chain Vulnerabilities to Attack EV Charging Infrastructure." https://www.saiflow.com/publications/ev-charging-supply-chain-vulnerabilities/
[9] Plaxidity. (2025). "EV Charging Cyber Security: Critical Vulnerability Discovered in RFID Systems." https://plaxidityx.com/ev-charging-cyber-security-critical-vulnerability-discovered/
[10] Hoplon InfoSec. (2025). "EV Charging Provider Data Breach: Customer Data Exposed." https://hoploninfosec.com/blog/ev-charging-data-breach-2025/
[11] SEC Consult. (2025). "Cyber Threats to EV Charging Infrastructure - Grid Attack Scenarios." https://sec-consult.com/blog/ev-charging-grid-threats/
[12] Tennessee Government. (2024). "EV Charging Infrastructure Cybersecurity Plan Template." https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tdot/long-range-planning/multimodal/EV_Charging_Cybersecurity_Plan_Template.pdf
[13] Daloop. (2023). "How to ensure security and resilience in EV charging infrastructure." https://daloop.io/blog/security-resilience-ev-charging-infrastructure/
[14] EUR-Lex. (2016). "General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - Breach Notification." https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
[15] Vanta. (2024). "Third-Party Risk Management Best Practices." https://www.vanta.com/resources/third-party-risk-management
[16] Clarip. (2018). "GDPR 72 Hour Data Breach Notifications." https://clarip.com/data-protection/gdpr-72-hour-data-breach-notifications/
[17] Thoropass. (2024). "Understanding the GDPR breach notification timeline." https://www.thoropass.com/blog/gdpr-breach-notification-timeline
[18] The Legal School. (2025). "What to Do When GDPR Is Breached: Step-by-Step 72-Hour Guide." https://www.thelegalschool.in/gdpr-breach-notification-guide/
[19] NIST. (2024). "Cybersecurity Framework - Building Security Culture." https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
[20] Coalition Inc. (2024). "Cyber Insurance for Critical Infrastructure." https://www.coalitioninc.com/
[21] CharIN. (2024). "Charging Interface Initiative - Security Working Group." https://www.charin.global/technology/security/